- Abstract
The authors in the present Case Comment have analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court judgment in Kahler v Kansas. The court scrutinizes a novel issue pertaining to the power of a State to abolish traditional pillars of criminal law like the defense of insanity. The Court rejecting the plea held the defense to be existent both at the time of trial and sentencing.The authors while concurring with the opinion of the Court, have analyzed the form in which the defense exists in the State of Kansas. The authors have given practical circumstances to explain the merits of the Law as it exists in the State of Kansas and elucidated a critical viewpoint of the same. Further, a wider approach has been recommended so that the purpose of enactment of the defense of insanity can be fulfilled.
- Backdrop of the case
The present petition before the Supreme Court of the United States is a challenge to the decision of the trial Court of Kansas. This case is a continuation to the long-standing debate revolving around the manner and extent to which the tests laid down in the landmark R v Daniel M’ Naghten[1] case are to be applied. The courts in U.S. have emphasized the paramount role of the states in setting “standards of criminal responsibility.”[2] With the wide range of powers vested in the States in deciding criminal responsibility, different States exercising their discretion have adopted/formulated different approaches to exercise this defense.
As per the law of Kansas, the defendant can raise the plea of mental illness to show that it rendered him incapable of forming the required mental intent to commit the criminal act. No other plea of mental illness is recognized under the State Law. However, the same can be considered for mitigation of sentence. The petitioner (Kahler) in the present case had been charged with the murder of four family members which included his wife, daughters, and grandmother. He stated that he was suffering from depression due to the pending divorce case and being separated from his family which led him to commit the act. Kahler on the very next day surrendered before the police and was charged for capital murder. Before the initiation of the trial, the petitioner claimed that Kansa’s approach to the insanity defense was violative of the due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.[3] The plea was rejected by the Trial Court and subsequently, a death sentence was passed against him by the jury. The judgment of the Trial court has been challenged before the present court.
III. The Judgment of the Court
The Court in the present case analyzed numerous judicial precedents and other authoritative treatises in this regard and upheld the decision of the Trial Court. The Court acknowledged the various tests [4] laid down to avail the defense of insanity. Despite recognition of other tests by the Judicature of other States and common law countries, Kansas exercising its State sovereignty limits the defense of insanity only to its intention-based aspect.
The Court in this case held that a States rule about criminal liability can be said to be against the principle of due process only if it “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”[5] This means the practice essentially must be of historical importance. For determining what constitutes “historical practice”, various common law authorities and judicial decisions are to be referred.[6]
The Court concurred with the contention of the petitioner that insanity as a defense against criminal liability is of historical import. However, the Court opined that there has been no consensus amongst the jurist with respect to the tests for determining the same. Thus, none of the States can be bound to follow any stringent tests for establishing the defense of insanity.
The Court rejected the stand of the petitioner that the State of Kansas has abolished the defense of insanity. Contrary to this, it held that Kansas takes account of mental health at both trial and sentencing. Pursuant to it, the court concluded that due process does not require the State of Kansas to particular test for insanity as the defense is a project for state governance, not constitutional law.
III. Critical Analysisofthe Decision
The case deals with the issue of whether the non-applicability of certain tests for availing the defense of insanity is violative of the due process clause. The same has to be seen in light of as to what constitutes due process. Due process is some principle which is fundamentally rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people.[7] Thus, if negation or non-adoption of a certain rule would hamper some historical practice then it would violate the due process clause. The majority judgment after considering the various authorities and precedents rightly held the State’s action to be not violative of the due process as it does not hinder some historical practice. However, what one must consider is whether it was correct on the State’s part to provide such narrow scope for availing the defense of insanity. Kansas while exercising its discretion under the Law to frame the criminal standard for itself has not only redefined the principle but has gone contrary to its essence itself.[8]
It is of much relevance to take note of the traditional insanity defense as mentioned in M’Naghten’s Case. According to the said decision, the defense of insanity could be availed when the accused due to his mental instability at the time of offence was unable to know the nature and quality of the offence or was incapable of understanding whether his action was right or wrong. Though the rules laid down in the case have lately been criticized but it is because they do not consider the effects on the personality of the person including both the will and the emotions while under such mental incapacity.[9]The State of Kansas has further narrowed down the already criticized narrow interpretation done by the Courts. It has disregarded the traditional view that insanity depended on the defendant’s capacity at the time of the offense to distinguish right from wrong.[10]
The State Law of Kansas takes into consideration the “cognitive capacity” which determines whether the person understood what he was doing. While it disregards “moral capacity” which helps one to determine whether what they are doing is right or wrong. If we consider a situation in which the accused shot and killed an individual thinking him to be a dog. In the other situation a person under delusion shot and killed another person thinking that a dog had ordered him to do so. The evidence on record in both the situations shows that the persons were suffering from mental illnesses. In most of the jurisdictions, persons in both the scenarios would get the defense of insanity. However, in Kansas the person in the first situation would be provided the defense of insanity while the other would not.
A person must possess sufficient degree of reason in order to be liable for his actions.[11] This proposition is noticeably agreed to by the State of Kansas also. The person in the first situation clearly did not have the desired intention and reason but the person in the second scenario also cannot be said to be in a reasonable state of mind. Though the person was aware of the consequence of the action but he clearly cannot be said to have the culpability as thatof a reasonable prudent man on two grounds. Firstly, no prudent person would shoot another person under the circumstances prevailing in the second situation. Secondly, the cognitive or reasoning ability of a person also plays a role in determining whether something is right or wrong.
The common law jurists namely Bracton, Coke, Hale and Blackstone link the criminal liability of a person to his ability to free will, form his will and his moral understanding behind the commission of any act. Also, an insane person has always been compared to an infant and it is the moral nature of an act and not the physical nature, which a young child is unlikely to understand. However, the Law of Kansas fails to take into consideration the fact that the cognitive capacity cannot be totally separated from his moral capacity. To convict any person under Criminal Law it is very much essential to determine if the person is in a mental state to make a reasoned decision or has control over his senses. It has also been acknowledged by the famous jurist Coke that a mad man should not be convicted of his act because more than the capability to form the intent, he lacked the mind or discretion to commit it.[12] It has also been held by Chief Justice Mansfield’s that one who could not distinguish right from wrong “could have no intention at all”.
Concluding Remarks
Considering the aforementioned scenario, it is evident that the State of Kansas has completely discarded the moral capacity test while considering the defense of insanity. There cannot be a straight-jacket demarcation between reasoning ability and morality of an individual. Discarding an intrinsic aspect of the defense of insanity by any State cannot be said to be correct. Only an intention-based test of insanity would not suffice to determine insanity, the accused must have something more than bare ability to form intentions and carry them out.[13]
A person though may be having an intent to commit the act may not always be in a mental state to know the consequences and repercussions of the same as a reasonable man in his ordinary capacity can. Besides intention the State must also consider the circumstances under which the Act was committed. For instance, if a person shoots another under a delusion that he was ordered by a dog to do so. In such surrounding circumstances no prudent man would have taken such an action thus, he also lacks the cognitive ability to take a reasoned decision. Thus, both cognitive ability and morality can be seen to overlap and thus cannot be segregated while determining the criminal liability of an individual. Hence, there should be a circumstantial approach used instead of discarding any of the tests of insanity.
[1]R. v Daniel M’ Naghten, (1843) 8 E.R. 718.
[2]Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 570 (1968).
[3]U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
[4]Clark v Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, [ii] (2006).
[5]Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 807 (1952).
[6] Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 80 (1996).
[7]Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 807 (1952).
[8] Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (1934).
[9] Dr. Raj Kumar Upadhyay, Defence of Insanity under Indian Legal System: An Analysis, 7 IJEMR. 711, 714 (2017).
[10]Rex v. Lord Ferrers 1760, 19 St.Tr.885.
[11]R. v. Daniel M’ Naghten, (1843) 8 E.R. 718.
[12] Laws of England §405, p. 247b (1628).
[13] Regina v. Oxford, (1840) 9 Car. & P. 525.
